The British and French relied on Hitler to keep his word and their ability to react when he did not. But in hindsight, neither was well placed to respond to the German aggression. The appeasement made sense with the caveat that if there was evidence that it did not work, there would be more exchange of deterrent attitudes. It also follows that Britain should upgrade and maintain its will, which it has not done. The conclusion of this research is that this gap is dangerously similar to today`s Iranian agreement. U.S. politicians such as President Obama and presumed Democratic candidate Hilary Clinton are proposing to respond quickly with sanctions if Iran violates conditions. The President said: “If Iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all sanctions can be reinstated.” (Obama 2015) I think Iran is counting on the fact that this is not the case or that it is ineffective or too late to prevent nuclear weapons. Arguably the best reason why Hitler`s aggression was not considered an immediate threat and that appeasement was chosen as a strategy was the illusory appreciation of Hitler by the Allies. J. L. Richardson said, “The main reason for the failure of appeasement was that Hitler`s goals far exceeded the limits of reasonable arrangements that the Appeasers were willing to look at.” (Rock 2000, 49) The Munich Agreement (Czech: Mnichovska dohoda); in Slovak: Mnechovska dohoda; in German: Munchner Abkommen) or Munchner Verrat (Czech: Mnichovska zrada; The Slovak: Mnechovska zrada) was an agreement reached on 30 September 1938 in Munich by Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, the Third French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy.
It granted Germany the “transfer of the German territory of the Sudetenland” from Czechoslovakia.  Most of Europe celebrated the agreement because it prevented the war threatened by Adolf Hitler by allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland by Nazi Germany, a region of Western Czechoslovakia inhabited by more than 3 million people, mainly German-speaking. Hitler declared that this was his last territorial claim in Europe, and the choice seemed to lie between war and appeasement. Many in the British government believed that the United States could not be trusted as an ally because the country refused to join the League of Nations and retreated to its usual isolationism. Although the nation as a whole tended to be isolationist at that time, President Roosevelt proposed a working committee of nations that presented a document that covered the essential principles of international behavior. Chamberlain rejected this idea, however, on the grounds that Britain and France were already directly linked to Germany and Italy. Chamberlain preferred a “gentleman`s agreement” (with Hitler) if one were to appease. (Wheeler Bennett 1948, 270-1) Later, at the meeting, a deception was agreed in advance to influence and pressure Chamberlain: one of Hitler`s accomplices entered the room to inform Hitler of other Germans killed in Czechoslovakia, and Hitler then shouted: “I will avenge each of them. The Czechs must be destroyed.  The meeting ended with Hitler`s refusal to make concessions to the demands of the Allies.
 Later that evening, Hitler was concerned that he had gone too far to put pressure on Chamberlain, and he called Chamberlain`s hotel suite to say that he would only accept the annexation of Sudetenland without plans in other areas, provided that Czechoslovakia began evacuating ethnic Chechens from the majority regions of Germany by 8 p.m. on September 26.